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ABSTRACT 
 
The case involves distributors who import Mexican produce into the United States.  To-Mex faces 
several problems.  First, U.S. homeland security is at an all time high and is likely to continue 
growing tighter. The potential for delays at customs is significant. Second, Mexican produce has 
image issues in the U.S. market. Some American consumers have the perception that Mexican 
produce may not be safe to eat.  Changing those perceptions is critical. The third issue relates to 
product strategies, including a possible move from predominantly field grown tomatoes to 
greenhouse operations, possible development of consumer brands for produce, and the potential 
effects of country of origin labeling on consumer produce preferences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ack Barraza, president of To-Mex, a family-owned fresh produce distribution company based in Nogales, 
Arizona, squinted in the bright Sinoloan sun as he looked across the fields, and he was worried. It looked 
like a healthy crop of tomatoes and he knew that the production yield was up, but many of his competitors 
were devoting more resources to greenhouse tomatoes and he wondered if that was one of the changes he would 
soon be forced to make.  “The whole industry depends on a good delivery and yet there are so many obstacles to 
getting there,” he thought to himself.  
 
 Jack had flown down to Culiacan, Mexico, to talk face-to-face with his grower and long-time business 
partner, Enrique. Jack and Enrique, and their fathers and grandfathers before them, had been successfully growing 
tomatoes in Mexico for export to the U.S. for generations, but many changes were occurring in the produce industry 
and they knew that they would have to adapt in order to continue to survive.   
 
HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE MEXICAN PRODUCE INDUSTRY 
 
 Families in Nogales had been in the produce business for years. The fathers and grandfathers of the 
growers worked with the fathers and grandfathers of the distributors and in some cases, the fathers and grandfathers 
of others in the industry. One of the distributors explained it this way. “In our business everything is relationship 
based. Your father passes his relationships down to you and you will pass those relationships down to your son. This 
gives you a distinct advantage getting started. It is also the reason that major growers like Del Monte and Chiquita 
haven‟t been able to get a strong hold in northern Mexico.”  Some companies were vertically integrated, but most 
had simply developed extremely close relationships with other independent companies. 
 
 Competitors were also friends in this industry. Everyone in the industry knew everyone else. Amazingly, 
transactions among the channel members were still sealed with a handshake instead of a contract. Because it was 
such a unique industry in terms of the family-based model, if anyone failed to meet their obligation, they were 
essentially shut out of the industry. Word traveled quickly in this close-knit industry and no one would do business 
with a channel member who let them down.   
 
 Those close relationships did not necessarily mean that there was complete trust among the players, 
however. As Enrique said, “We get along fine with our competitors as long as we‟re not talking tomatoes.” But 
J 
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often the needs of the industry took precedence over individual jealousies or competitions. Everyone in the industry 
had to work together to resolve problems facing them all. In the early days, all the Mexican growers came together 
to help the industry survive even though they were adversarial in business. This tradition and desire to keep the 
industry healthy continued.  
 
 But despite this tradition, there were business models other than the family based model beginning to come 
into the industry. A few companies in parts of the United States distributed produce through companies in Nogales 
but without salespeople in Nogales. Rather than walking through the fields and warehouses daily, the salespeople 
worked from a central office and relied on warehouse managers to tell them what was available. This seemed 
strange to the Nogales distributors. “People don‟t know what they are selling anymore,” one distributor commented 
as he reached for a tomato and turned it over to check for blemishes. “How can they sell tomatoes without looking at 
them?” 
 
THE CHANNEL MEMBERS 
 
The Growers 
 
 The growers were responsible for maintaining the fields (and/or greenhouses), determining the best 
combination of crops, and managing the workers. The growers were also responsible for managing the packing 
facilities which were typically in close proximity to the fields. Growers often had thousands of employees. The field 
workers were from the southern states of Mexico. The packers were mostly local Mexicans and many had been 
working at their jobs for many years; for example, at one facility there were 30 people with over 30 years of 
employment. Many times a grower hired a head of household and his family. Because many of the workers were 
migrants from southern Mexico, the grower provided housing, healthcare and childcare for the families during the 
picking season. This was seen by the grower as both a social responsibility, as well as a way to improve the 
productivity of the workers since they did not have to worry about the welfare of their children while they were at 
work. 
 
 After the produce was picked, it was moved to the packing areas. Some of these were in open warehouses 
(called sheds), and others went to very tightly monitored and “sealed” warehouses. Regardless of the type of packing 
area, the produce was washed in a chlorine bath and then sorted by size and grade and packed for shipment to the 
distributors. Some sorting was done by hand, some by screens that dropped smaller produce to a second conveyor, 
and in some packing facilities, computerized digital computers took a picture of each tomato, recorded size and 
color and then sorted the produce automatically. Sanitation standards were strictly adhered to. Workers washed as 
they entered the facility, wore hair nets and masks, swept the floors continuously, etc. (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Packing Facilities 
 
 
 Some produce was packed in returnable plastic containers (RPC) and others in corrugated cardboard boxes 
and others in display ready containers (DRC). This was typically determined by the retailer. Some retailers (e.g., 
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Wal-Mart) displayed produce in bulk in the carton and preferred the look of the DRCs.  Weight of the cartons was 
an issue because OSHA limited the weight a person could lift. Produce that was determined not to be usable was 
routed to trucks and sold off as animal feed. 
 
 The growers did not sell directly to retailers. They sold to distributors. The grower notified the distributor 
by FAX nightly to tell them how many trucks were in route to the U.S./ Mexico border. Sometimes as many as 60 
trucks a day headed from Culiacan to Nogales from a single grower. 
 
The Distributors 
 
 Distributors predominantly sold their grower‟s brand, but also sold the brands of other growers. They also 
tended to specialize in a certain type of produce, but would try to get whatever their customer needed from other 
distributors. Distributors got an invoice from the growers so that they knew what produce was on its way to Nogales. 
The invoices were forwarded by the distributor to the customs broker so he could get the paperwork ready for the 
trucks that would be crossing the border. The distributors maintained a sales force that worked with customers and 
negotiated price. The salespeople specialized in different types of produce, but worked together to take care of 
customers. Distributors sold either to other distributors, to retailers, to companies who did further processing (e.g., 
slicing, canning), or to food service companies.  
 
 It was the sales force who set price. Price was determined by supply and demand like many other 
commodities. The weather played a critical role in pricing because of its effect on supply. If, for example, rain 
prevented harvesting of competitors‟ crops in Florida, Mexican produce prices increased. After the salespeople 
checked the weather in both their growing regions and the growing regions of competitors in the U.S. and talked to a 
few customers, they got a feel for supply and demand. They quoted a high price and then got a reaction to that price. 
Then, lots of negotiation occurred until the price was established. Consequently there was a lot of variation in 
margins earned. The price changed many times during the day; however, there was an unwritten policy that price did 
not change over the weekend. 
 
 The distributors built relationships with their customers and tried to help them find the product they needed 
when supply was short (as long as the customer didn‟t abandon them when the supply plentiful). They also talked to 
customers to find out what was going on with their competitors (e.g. what they have available to ship, prices, etc.) 
 
 The growers and distributors worked together to determine what product to pick. If for example, the 
distributor‟s customer wanted roma tomatoes, but the grower in Culiacan didn‟t have romas that were ready to pick, 
the distributor either got them from another one of their growers or managed the sale by informing the customer of 
the day that the romas would be available. 
 
Customs Broker 
 
 Customs brokers handled the export/import paperwork for other channel members.  They were licensed by 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury and were trained to have a thorough knowledge of tariffs and regulations 
affecting the importation of produce. Austin Roberts was Jack‟s customs broker. Austin‟s income was based on 
volume. He received about $55 per truck. He did not have contracts with distributors which made his a fairly high 
risk job. “I‟d prefer having contracts,” said Austin, “but because of the tradition of family based relationships, I 
might offend my clients if I insisted on contracts. And anyway, I know who I‟m dealing with. There have only been 
a couple of times that I didn‟t get paid. And they‟re no longer in the business.”  Customs brokers were originally 
used only by small distributors who couldn‟t handle all the paperwork, but now even large shippers like FedEx were 
using them because they were specialized and helped expedite the process. 
 
Commission Merchant or Broker 
 
 This type of intermediary did not take title to (i.e. own) the produce. Instead, they found buyers for 
tomatoes and took around a 10% commission on the produce they sold for the grower.  Sometimes the distributor 
served this function. However, it was becoming less common unless a customer needed a specialty item and the 
distributor could not find it for them. 
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Retailers 
 
 Retailers were the grocery stores and discount stores where the ultimate consumer bought fresh produce. 
Smaller retailers could buy from a distributor near their store location who had purchased from a distributor in 
Nogales. 
 
Food Service and Fast Food Companies 
 
 Food service companies included distributors who sold food service to other institutions like hospitals, 
restaurants, and schools. An example of this type of company was Sysco. 
 
Further Processors 
 
 Some produce was sold to companies who changed the form in some way. For example some companies 
sliced tomatoes to prepare them for sale to fast food restaurants. Canning companies would also be included as a 
further processor. 
 
THE NOGALES PORT OF ENTRY 
 
 Nogales was the largest land port in the world for produce. The Nogales port handled over a billion dollars 
worth of produce each year. Fifty percent of the produce eaten in the U.S. and Canada in the winter came from 
Mexico. And 60% of produce that was grown in Mexico crossed the U.S. border at Nogales. Between November 
and March, approximately 90% of what crossed at Nogales was produce.  
 
 The Nogales port was extremely efficient for the number of trucks that crossed each day.  Approximately 
1200 trucks a day crossed at the Nogales facility even though it was built to handle 300 trucks a day. The customs 
compound was not open 24 hours a day. They started at 8:00 a.m. and stayed open until the line of trucks 
diminished. There was a commercial truck facility at the border to separate tourists/individuals from commercial 
crossings. This helped to accommodate produce growers and also anything that was produced by factories or 
maquiladoras in Mexico.  
 
 Both the Agriculture Department and the USDA operated at the port. The inspectors included homeland 
security, border patrol, department of agriculture, and the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT). The 
inspectors, depending on their area of expertise, were looking for drugs, illegal aliens, diseases or insects on produce 
and any potential threat to U.S. national security. Even the pallets on which the boxes were loaded were inspected 
for infestation. 
 
 As trucks came to the port of entry, various entry papers had to be presented. There had to be a detailed 
invoice stating where they came from, where they were going and country of origin (“made in” or “product of”). 
There had to also be a manifest describing what the driver was carrying (e.g. tomatoes) and the weight. A customs 
broker could be used to do the paperwork to make sure the driver had the proper documentation for entry along with 
the driver‟s personal identification. The driver was ultimately responsible for what was on the truck, even if a broker 
was used. The broker pre-files the paperwork electronically so it could be matched to what the driver was carrying 
and this expedited the border crossing process. Customs officials enforced the regulations.  
 
 As the truck came across the border there was a prescreening area where officials looked inside for 
anything that was blatantly illegal. After looking at the paperwork, the truck was either released or moved in for 
further scrutiny. If further inspection was required, the trucks were pulled into a dock area and the trucks were 
completely unloaded. Inspectors physically looked inside individual boxes. In addition the truck could be x-rayed. 
Mexican trucks had not been allowed to continue beyond the border, but the NAFTA agreement had included a 
schedule to open national borders to trucks from Canada and Mexico. Although this provision could have eliminated 
a time consuming transfer of produce between trucks, the provision had been met with significant controversy based 
on the concern that many Mexican-owned trucks did not meet the minimum safety standards.  
 
Journal of Business Case Studies – November/December 2011 Volume 7, Number 6 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  43 
Caades 
 
 Caades was a cooperative of growers who had created a facility a few miles south of the border in order to 
complete their own inspections. This was not required, but added in an extra inspection (value-added) to help 
expedite the border crossing. They hired customs inspectors who checked quality and condition of produce. At the 
cooperative, they also checked load weights and corrected any overages prior to the truck crossing the border. 
Brokers maintained offices at customs and also at Caades. Growers paid dues to become members of the facility. 
About seventy percent of Mexican growers used Caades. 
 
 Jack knew it was getting harder and harder to move produce across the busy Nogales port of entry due to 
U.S. homeland security issues. Because of the perishable nature of produce, he knew this was no small issue. It took 
a truck 14 hours to get from Culiacan where Enrique‟s fields were, across the border and into Nogales where the 
distribution facilities were located. He was glad that a group of county and city based growers, brokers and 
distributors had recently formed the Nogales Port Authority to address problems faced by those using the port at 
Nogales.  
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
 Various laws regulated what produce could be brought into the U.S. Sometimes these laws were to protect 
U.S. growers and could be issued by State. Also there were periodic restrictions based on identification of a 
particular pest in a country (e.g. fruit fly).Regulations about what could come into the U.S. could change daily. [See 
appendix A for relevant regulations.] 
 
 Jack was particularly concerned about two regulatory issues. It really made him mad that the Mexican 
tomato industry was currently obligated by The Tomato Suspension Agreement to not sell tomatoes under a 
minimum price (International Trade Administration, 2008). “It ties our hands when we are trying to be competitive 
on price. And we weren‟t dumping in the U.S. in the first place. U.S. growers just couldn‟t compete with us and so 
they said we were pricing too low. But a lot of factors impacted their supply, like the hurricanes in Florida, so their 
prices were naturally going to be higher than ours.”  Jack knew that the U.S. tried to protect its industries and he 
could appreciate that. But it also made it hard for U.S. importers of Mexican produce to stay in business and that 
didn‟t seem fair either. 
 
Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) 
 
 Another proposed law that concerned him and others in the industry was country-of origin labeling 
(COOL). Mexican produce had always been labeled on the shipping crates. However, with the “COOL” laws, 
retailers were required to notify their customers of the source of produce like tomatoes (as well as some other 
agricultural products).Growers and distributors were concerned that it could significantly raise prices to both 
distributors and consumers. 
 
 Country of origin labeling was a part of the 2002 Farm Bill and required mandatory labeling of a variety of 
products including red meat, seafood and produce for the purpose of informing the ultimate consumer of the source 
of products. It originally established September 30, 2004 as the implementation date. Because of significant 
controversy, the implementation of this amendment to the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 was delayed until 
2008 (usda.gov, 2009) 
 
 The debate surrounding COOL centered on whether COOL on individually purchased products was a 
consumer right to know issue or if it was actually a trade barrier to reduce competition from imports for U.S. 
producers. “We‟ve always put „Grown in Mexico‟ on our shipping containers,” said Jack. “It‟s required by law for 
products entering the U.S. But if we have to put it (the label) on each individual piece of produce, it‟s going to drive 
costs up. And anyway, I‟m not sure American consumers care where their tomatoes are grown if they taste good!”  
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PRODUCT ISSUES 
 
 One of the difficulties faced by tomato growers was that the variety of tomatoes was continually growing 
and while consumer preferences appeared to be changing, consumer choices in produce were often moderated by 
what was available at their local retailer. Most of Enrique‟s tomatoes were going to the big retailers and they wanted 
quality (no blemishes) and size. He knew that he could grow bigger and less blemished tomatoes in greenhouses. 
However, based on his sales figures, it seemed that the demand for large tomatoes by ultimate consumers was 
declining. Consumers appeared to like variety including, shape and size (e.g. romas, on-the vine, grape), and even 
degree of ripeness and color (Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1:  Mexican Tomato Exports (to U.S.) by Type 
Year Cherry Grape Greenhouse Round 1 Roma 
1995 40,889   391,797 160,337 
1996 41,975   429,710 213,992 
1997 39,281   409,229 212,098 
1998 50,307   415,848 267,899 
1999 49,980  3,728 303,970 257,467 
2000 37,834  27,468 277,995 246,585 
2001 40,249  33,398 312,077 293,495 
2002 39,291 16,915 42,140 309,262 315,817 
2003 32,379 25,086 58,357 323,456 345,892 
1Includes both vine-ripe and green tomatoes 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce; Cook and Calvin Report, April 2005 
 
 
Green Tomatoes versus Red Tomatoes 
 
 Green tomatoes (those with no pink) have to be exposed to ethylene gas in order to ripen and are stored in 
gas rooms (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Tomato Gas Rooms 
 
 
 If the tomatoes had begun to ripen, they were considered vine-ripe because they would ripen without gas. 
Tomatoes picked green had little or no flavor. The longer tomatoes stayed on the stem the higher the sugar content 
and therefore they tasted better. Despite this fact, there was a strong demand for gassed tomatoes (i.e. greens) 
Gassed green tomatoes typically weren‟t in grocery stores. They went to fast food and food service companies 
because they were less juicy, and therefore sliced better and were less “drippy” on sandwiches. People in the 
industry used to predict that the market for greens would disappear, but because of the growth of food service and 
fast food, there continued to be growth in demand. A large portion of Jack and Enrique‟s business was in green 
tomatoes, and this had helped protect them from competition from greenhouse tomatoes. 
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Field Grown versus Greenhouse Grown Tomatoes 
 
 There were many advantages to growing in green houses. First, it was more efficient to grow produce 
inside. Greenhouses produced more than open fields. 15 hectors (2.5 acres) could produce as much as 80 hectors of 
field grown produce. Also, produce could be picked regardless of the weather if the grower used greenhouses. It was 
also more efficient because the grower could control how water and fertilizer/nutrients were added. All irrigation 
and window movement (for temperature control) was computerized in greenhouses. Growers took weekly soil and 
foliage samples and adjusted fertilizer as needed. In the fields, watering and fertilizing was much more labor 
intensive and there was a lot of waste.  
 
 Secondly, growers could produce higher grades of produce (bigger and less blemished) indoors. Insects and 
disease couldn‟t get in and therefore the produce was not likely to be blemished. One of Enrique‟s competitors had 
already moved a large amount of production into greenhouses. “For cucumbers, you can get 88% supers in a green 
house versus 25% in open fields,” he said. “There are customers for every grade, but supers get the best price and 
you can always go down on price if demand is low or there is a lot of competition.”  The major deterrent to 
switching from field to greenhouse was the investment. Greenhouses were very high cost endeavors. A very high 
technology greenhouse could cost over a million dollars to construct per hectare, not including the variable costs 
related to growing (Cook and Calvin, 2005), and the technology continually changed. The current design would 
withstand 80 miles per hour, but insurance was extremely high. The deductible was typically 25%.  In Mexico, the 
style of green house used was from Israel. They were not glass like the greenhouses in Holland because 
temperatures were higher in Mexico and there was less need to protect plants from the cold. Also Israeli growers 
were experts in irrigation and seed development because they had little water (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Mexican Greenhouses 
 
 
 Third, greenhouses allowed a grower to produce year round. This was a major advantage for regions where 
parts of the year prohibited field growing. However, Sinaloa‟s warm, humid climate made year round greenhouse 
production very costly. Jack and Enrique knew that the advantage that Mexican growers had from being able to 
grow tomatoes in the winter for shipment to the U.S. would be gone if major growers in the U.S. turned to 
greenhouse growing. However, Mexican greenhouse production of tomatoes was growing in importance and more 
and more hectares were being dedicated to greenhouse production (USDA Foreign Agriculture GAIN report, June 
2010). In the U.S., greenhouse vegetable production was approximately twice as many hectares as in Mexico and 
tomatoes were the leading greenhouse crop (Diver, 2000). 
 
Branding 
 
 The growers in Mexico and their distribution partners had developed brands for use inside the distribution 
channel. However, most of the brands were not directed to the ultimate consumer. Because produce was generally 
presented and sold in bulk to the ultimate consumer, there were fewer consumer brands in produce than in other 
categories of products. Of course, there were the major grower brands, such as Chiquita and Dole, but many growers 
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had not attempted to promote their brands to ultimate consumers. However, Jack and Enrique and a few other 
Mexican growers had recently begun to experiment with consumer branding by putting product into “clamshell” 
packaging with labels to appeal to the ultimate consumer. 
 
FOOD SAFETY AND TRACEABILITY 
 
“Did you see that story in the newspaper about the woman who says she got salmonella from tomatoes on a 
convenience store sandwich?” asked Jack. “Yeah,” replied Enrique. “Here we go again. Americans will be afraid 
to buy Mexican produce for awhile and the suspension agreement will keep us from lowering the price. I heard the 
FDA may even put a ban on tomatoes until they can trace the cause!”  
 
 Periodically there were news stories in which Mexican produce was linked to hepatitis, salmonella and 
other life threatening illnesses.  In 2002, it was Mexican cantaloupes; more recently there were claims that people in 
Pennsylvania got sick from salmonella tainted tomatoes on convenience store sandwiches. There were quite a few 
examples of contaminated produce from Mexico, but there were also instances of U.S. farms being linked to the 
same diseases. But in either case, news stories had a significant effect on the perceptions that U.S. customers had 
about fruit and vegetables from Mexico. When the fruits or vegetables were traced to Mexico (either correctly or 
incorrectly), the FDA often established a ban on shipments of that fruit or vegetable for a period of time. Many 
growers and distributors felt it was unfair to punish all growers and packers of a category of produce when possibly 
one grower was to blame. FDA decisions of this type could be devastating to distributors and their growers who had 
already planted the banned item. 
 
 News stories in the U.S. describing incidents of possible bacteria or other contamination on Mexican 
produce created negative perceptions of quality, even though sanitation and safety control were monitored very 
closely in Mexican produce facilities. Misperceptions by U.S. consumers about Mexican produce created an 
advantage for U.S. producers because it caused customer reactions.  
 
 Enrique and other growers in Mexico were highly aware of the need to maintain sanitary conditions in the 
fields and packing sheds and were very careful. The water supply that went to the produce was monitored 24 hours a 
day. It was filtered first, then fertilizer with nutrients was added and then it was dispensed to the field via canals. In 
the U.S., much of the produce grown was field packed and therefore was distributed with minimal cleaning. In 
Mexico, the growers took all produce to the packing areas where it was cleaned before packing. They had to do this 
because of the volume being sold to U.S., and because of negative publicity about Mexican produce. They also kept 
records so they could trace a problem if needed. All boxes were bar-coded and the packers were paid by the box, so 
they could track who packed the produce as well as the productivity of the packer. Traceability had become a major 
issue to the entire produce industry (Produce Marketing Association, 2002) However, due to many organizations in 
the produce industry having proprietary traceability systems, those systems were often not integrated throughout the 
supply chain.  Although PLU and UPC codes had been effective for most grocery products, produce industry experts 
felt that a separate standardized product identification would be beneficial throughout the produce supply chain 
(Industry Roadmap, 2007) 
 
HOW DO WE CHANGE? 
 
 Jack scratched his head and then pulled his well-worn straw hat back in place as he walked back down the 
dirt road. He knew that he and Enrique were facing hard times if they didn‟t make some changes. But they couldn‟t 
just toss aside the successful methods of their fathers and grandfathers, could they? The question was how to 
leverage the historical success of the family business to meet the challenges of the future. Which pieces of the 
business should they continue and which required serious adaptation?  
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APPENDIX A 
 
The Plant Protection Act of 2000 (PPA):  This law authorizes the secretary of agriculture to prohibit or restrict 
imports of plants if it is necessary to prevent the introduction of dissemination of a plant pest or disease (from The 
Produce Marketing Association 2005) 
 
Trade Act of 2002:  This law relates to many aspects of trade, but it specifically requires that the Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection receive an advance electronic transmission of cargo information prior to the load moving 
across the border. Exporters must declare what is in the truck. There can be only one grower‟s produce per truck.  
 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty program (AD/CVD):  This program is intended to help U.S. companies 
compete with foreign industry by prohibiting a foreign from price discrimination referred to as dumping. U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission play key 
roles in administering AD/CVD laws. Dumping occurs when a foreign producer sells a product in the U.S. at a price 
that is below that producer‟s sales price in its home market, or at a price that is lower than production (U.S. 
International Trade Commission 2005). 
 
Tomato Suspension Agreement:  Specifies minimum sales prices for improted tomatoes and establishes the 
conditions under which claims can be made by buyers (International Trade Administration 2008) 
 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA):  NAFTA established a free trade zone in North America and 
lifted the tariffs on the majority of goods coming into the U.S. from Mexico. 
 
Country-of Origin Labeling (Farm Security and Rural Investment Act):  Requires country of origin labeling (e.g. 
“Product of Mexico) on many products (including produce) 
 
Bioterrorism Act:  This act authorizes the Food and Drug Administration to detain an article of food at the border if 
there is an indication that it presents a threat of serious health consequences or death to humans or animals. (FDA 
2004). 
 
 
